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Abstract 
This paper elaborates the likelihood of China to revise the current international regime 
led by US’ global hegemony. The main questions of this paper are: How does neo-
liberalism explain the chance of China’s threat towards United States’ Global 
Hegemony in the 21st century? Moreover, how the assertive approaches of China under 
Xi Jinping leadership could be explained under ‘China Peaceful Rise’ thesis? A number 
of analysts, such as John J. Mearsheimer and G. John Ikenberry have already engaged 
in a debate on whether the rise of China’s economy would change it into a revisionist 
state that engage in a hegemonic war against the United States. This paper contributes 
to this debate by providing an analysis of ‘China Threat Theory’ vs. ‘China Peaceful 
Rise’ thesis. In order to find out the likelihood of China to pursue global hegemony in 
the near future, an analysis is conducted by utilizing Neo-liberalism as a theoretical 
framework. This paper argues that despite the neo-realists’ assumption of China’s 
potential threat over the current liberal international system, China’s tremendous 
economic rise can be accommodated peacefully. The assertive foreign policies of China 
under Xi Jinping leadership do not necessarily imply China’s threat towards US global 
hegemony. The inference of this paper has a wider implication on the literature of 
‘China Peaceful Rise’, as the concept has evolved in addressing the dynamic challenges 
encountered by China along the way.  
Keywords:  China, Hegemony, Neo-liberalism
Introduction 
 Ever since the Chinese economic 
reform under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership 
in 1978, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has experienced a transformation 
from a rural agricultural society to an 
urban market-based society. The Chinese 
economic reform has lifted 500 million 
people out of poverty as China’s poverty 
rate fell from 65 per cent to less than 10 
per cent in 2014. China’s economy in the 
21st century is among the biggest 
economies in the world. After overtaking 
Japan’s economy in 2010, China today is 
the second largest economy after the 
United States (World Bank 2014: p. 4). In 
the International Relations realm, China’s 
transformation and economic rise 
consequentially have created a political 
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debate on whether the country will be a 
revisionist power (considering China’s 
different ideological orientation from the 
United States, it can be a system-
challenging power or threat to United 
States’ global hegemony) or a power that 
preserves the ‘status quo’ of the current 
international system led by the United 
States. The idea of China’s rise as a threat 
towards the current international regimes 
led by the United States is originated in 
the neo-realist school of thoughts, the idea 
then spread out across other International 
Relations’ perspectives. Within the neo-
realists’ literature, the ‘China Threat 
Theory’ portrays China as a rising power 
that will destabilize global political and 
economic system (Scott and Wilkinson 
2013: p. 761). 
 According to the ‘China Threat 
Theory’, the growing economic strength 
of China will lead the country to pursue 
its national interests in a more assertive 
manner. China’s assertiveness then will 
trigger the United States to balance 
against it and create a competition 
between these two great powers. This 
competition will generate a situation 
parallel to the ideological hegemonic war 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War (Glaser 2011: 
p 81).  In response to the ‘China Threat 
Theory’, the Chinese government felt an 
urgency to decrease the tension and build 
a supportive international environment 
for China’s ascendancy. In his December 
2003 speech at Harvard University, the 
Chinese Premier Wen Jia bao came with 
the thesis of ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’. 
Several points that highlighted in the 
speech were 
First, China's development depends 
upon and in return will contribute to the 
world peace; second, China will resort to 
peaceful means for development; third, 
China's development will rely more on its 
own resources and market; fourth, China is 
prepared for a long-term process of hard 
work, even several generations, for economic 
prosperity. Finally, even as China has 
achieved its economic development, it will 
not seek hegemony in the world or come out 
as a threat to any country (Ming Xia: 2005). 
 Despite the Chinese government’s 
effort to calm down the speculation about 
China’s intention to challenge United 
States’ global hegemony in the 21st 
century, a neo-realist scholar, 
Mearsheimer (2010: p. 383) argued that a 
country’s intention could not be 
empirically verified from its diplomats’ 
statements, as it has been known that the 
credibility of leaders’ statements to 
foreign audiences is doubtful. Hence, it is 
hard to know Chinese leader’s motivation 
with their rising economic power just 
from their claim on a peaceful rise. This 
essay examines the existing debate 
between ‘China Threat Theory’ and 
‘China’s Peaceful Rise’ in the 21st century 
from the neo-liberal perspective. It tries to 
elaborate the possibility of China to 
challenge the United States’ global 
hegemony by utilizing its rising economic 
power.  
 By means of neo-liberal 
perspective and supported by empirical 
analysis, this essay makes two main 
arguments. First, it argues that despite the 
neo-realists’ assumption of China’s 
potential threat over the current liberal 
international system (which is led by the 
United States as the global hegemony), 
China’s tremendous economic rise can be 
accommodated peacefully for two reasons. 
The first reason is that China’s economic 
rise itself is enabled by the existing liberal 
international system, which is 
perpetuated by the United States’ and its 
allies. Whereas the second reason is 
because it is less costly for the current 
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one-party-rule China to achieve its 
national interests by maintaining a 
cooperative strategic relationship with the 
United States compared to challenging the 
United States’ global hegemony and 
revising the current liberal international 
system.  
 Second, this essay argues that the 
assertive foreign policies of China under 
Xi Jinping leadership do not necessarily 
imply China’s threat towards US global 
hegemony. China has entered the 
‘peaceful rise 2.0’ period. In this period, 
China is more tenacious in protecting its 
core national interest. The ‘peaceful rise 
2.0’ does not signify zero conflict with 
other countries, yet China still strives to 
accommodate its rise peacefully. Even 
though China does not have the ambition 
to challenge US’ global hegemony in the 
near future, it does pursue a hegemon 
status in the region. China sees its 
leadership in the region as naturally and 
historically legitimate; however, China’s 
ambition to be regional hegemon would 
meet challenges including the indirect 
balancing from Southeast Asia. 
This essay will be organized into 
three main parts. The first part of this 
essay will elaborate the theoretical debate 
between neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
perspectives and their assumptions about 
the ‘China Threat Theory’. The second 
part will provide empirical analysis to 
support the analysis of China’s likelihood 
to challenge United States’ global 
hegemony in the 21st century based on the 
neo-liberalism perspective. The third part 
will analyze the potential of China to 
become the regional hegemonic power 
and then followed by a conclusion. 
How Neo-Liberalism is Different from 
Neo-Realism in Explaining the ‘China 
Threat Theory.' 
 The neo-realist school of thought is 
an International Relations’ perspective 
that is built on several main assumptions 
(Mearsheimer 2013: p.79). The first 
assumption is that the world politics 
operates in an anarchic system, and great 
powers are the main actors within it.  The 
second assumption is that states are 
uncertain about other states’ purpose. 
Therefore some states balance their power 
against each other (the revisionist states) 
while other states are satisfied with the 
current system and have no intention to 
change it (status quo states). The third 
assumption is that the main goal of all 
States is maintaining their survival. States 
always try to maintain the autonomy of 
their domestic political order and their 
territorial integrity. The fourth 
assumption is that states are rational 
actors that always come out with a 
strategy to perpetuate their survival.  
 Based on the neo-realists’ 
assumptions mentioned above, the rising 
economic power of China will be a serious 
threat for United States’ hegemony, as 
China’s rising economy will rationally be 
followed by its military build-up. 
Moreover, as the World Bank confirmed 
China’s position as the second-largest 
economy after the United States, the 
United States will try to balance its power 
against China. All United States’ post-
Cold War presidents, including Barack 
Obama, have stated that they were 
committed in maintaining American 
primacy. Hence, Washington is more 
likely to go to prevent China from 
becoming too powerful (Mearsheimer 
2010: p. 385). As neo-realists assume that 
both China and United States are rational 
actors that will maximize their security in 
the anarchic world politics, there is no 
way for both countries to secure their 
survival but to compete in becoming the 
most powerful state or the only 
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hegemonic state of the system.  According 
to neo-realists, a hegemonic war is the 
logical consequence of China’s rising 
economy (Mearsheimer 2010: p. 387). 
Furthermore, the neo-realists argue that in 
order to fully eradicate its poverty, China 
has to make a fundamental change in this 
Western imperialist economic regime and 
promote its ideology (being a revisionist 
power to the existing system). China also 
will use its newly built economic power to 
coerce other states towards Chinese 
interests. The neo-realists believe that 
China’s economic power is worth nothing 
if it is not being used. China could, for 
example, utilize its holding of US 
Treasury bonds to get the United States to 
stop selling arms to Taiwan (Shambaugh 
2011: p. 11-12). 
 In contrast to neo-realism 
perspective, neo-liberalism offers a 
different view of China’s threat towards 
United States’ hegemony. Neo-liberalism 
shares neo-realism assumption that states 
are unitary, rational, utility-maximizing 
actors that interact in an anarchic system. 
States always make decisions that 
prioritize their national interests. 
However, it also includes the role of 
international institutions as a framework 
for analyzing International Relations’ 
issues. International institutions or 
international regimes are ‚sets of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of International Relations‛ 
(Krasner 1983: p.2). International regimes 
give positive contributions in the anarchic 
global politics by helping states in 
obtaining international collective 
outcomes. States will obtain an absolute 
gain through collective cooperation on a 
global scale. The negative impacts of the 
anarchic international system can be 
mitigated through the existence of 
international institutions (Folker 2013: pp. 
114-115). 
The neo-liberalists’ optimism in 
international institutions makes them see 
the prospect of China’s peaceful rise in a 
more optimistic way, relatively to the neo-
realists. Ikenberry, a neo-liberalist, argue 
that the narrative of China as a revisionist 
state that will challenge United States’ 
global hegemony and bring the word into 
hegemonic transition period has missed 
the reality that despite there is 
diminishing gap between China’s and 
United States’ power, the liberal 
international order which is currently led 
by the United States is still alive and 
stands firm. It is rational for China to 
struggle in pursuing its national interest 
by utilizing its economic power in global 
politics however China will not pursue its 
interest by contesting the basic rules and 
principles of the existing liberal 
international order. Instead, China wishes 
to gain more bargaining power and 
leadership within it. In other words, 
China will not be a revisionist state to the 
current international system that goes 
through an ideological hegemonic war 
against the United States, despite the fact 
that China holds different ideology 
(communism) from the United States’ 
(democracy) (Ikenberry 2011: p 57). 
Moreover, ‚an aggressive or hegemonic 
China is out of the question because 
China needs as a long-lasting peaceful 
international environment for its 
development" (Roy 1996: p. 762). 
 The neo-liberalists argue that the 
current international order be defined by 
economic and political openness through 
international regimes and institutions 
(such as Word Trade Organization (WTO) 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF)). 
Thus, it can accommodate China's rise 
peacefully (Glaser 2011: p.80). 
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Furthermore, China’s economy has 
already deeply integrated into the 
international economic system that its 
domestic national interests have become 
part of a larger quest (Nathan 2012: pp.32-
33). The deep economic interdependence 
between China and United States in the 
existing liberal international system will 
be the reason for both powers to avoid a 
breakdown of the multilateral 
international regime itself. As a 
consequence, China’s rising economy will 
not threaten United States’ global 
hegemony in the existing order as the 
international regimes should enable both 
the United States and China to protect 
their vital interests without posing large 
threats to each other (Glaser 2011: p.83). 
Overall, a strategic peaceful partnership 
between China and United States within 
international regime framework will be 
more advantageous for both powers 
compared to a hegemonic war as it could 
increase the probability of sustained 
worldwide economic growth, peaceful 
resolutions of outstanding regional 
disputes, and successful cooperation in 
solving global transnational problems 
including terrorism and the nuclear 
weapons proliferation (Friedberg 2005: p. 
8). 
Analysis of China’s Likelihood to Threat 
United States’ Global Hegemony in the 
21st Century 
 Since the neo-realists argue that 
the neo-liberalists’ thesis of a peacefully 
rising China in the 21st century could not 
be empirically verified by Chinese 
diplomats’ statements only, an analysis of 
China’s national interests and how the 
state rationally pursues them in the global 
international institutions is prominent in 
order to confirm the validity of neo-
liberalists’ argument about China’s non-
threatening intention towards United 
States’ global hegemony. The neo-
liberalists argue that China’s rising 
economy in this 21st century will not make 
China a revisionist threat to the United 
States’ global hegemony because the rise 
happens in and is enabled by the United 
States-led international order. China is 
currently facing a Western international 
order (consisting of international regimes 
and institutions), which is a product of 
centuries of struggle and innovation. The 
existing international regimes (for 
example the International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank and World Trade 
Organization) are highly developed, 
integrated, institutionalized and rooted in 
both advanced developed countries and 
developing countries (Ikenberry 2011: 
p.58).  
As the world largest manufacturer 
and exporter, the availability of foreign 
markets and low trade tariffs are 
important for China’s economic 
development. One of the clearest evidence 
of how China maintains the status quo of 
United Stated-led international system is 
China’s effort to integrate deeper into the 
Western international regimes by joining 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. After 15 years of diplomatic effort, 
the country became a fully-fledged 
member of the WTO after the 142 
members of the WTO ratified China’s 
application (BBC: 2001). China’s decision 
to integrate itself to United States-led 
international economy regime is fully 
rational. Without WTO membership 
China will counter protectionism and 
discriminatory trade tariff, whereas by 
being WTO member, China is granted the 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status that 
gives it non-discriminatory equal trade 
advantages to other WTO members. The 
WTO is one of the most developed 
regimes of the liberal international system. 
China is deeply integrated to the existing 
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global trading system in which 40 per cent 
of its Gross National Product contributed 
from exports, and 25 per cent of its export 
market is the United States. China’s 
tremendous economic development in the 
past few decades is also enabled by 
unrestricted investment and trade with 
the United States and European countries 
(Ikenberry 2011: p. 62).   
 The United States leadership in the 
existing international economic system 
can be traced in its dominance power in 
the World Bank. The World Bank, which 
consists of five institutions, is one of the 
international regimes in which the voting 
power system is varied among member 
states based on their share of capital stock. 
The voting share in International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
one of the World Bank’s institutions, for 
example, is dominated by the United 
States by 15.09 per cent share, Japan holds 
the second largest share of 8.17 per cent, 
whereas China’s share is 5.7 per cent and 
the majority of developing countries has 
less than one per cent voting share in 
IBRD decision-making process (IBRD: 
2014). In International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), another World Bank’s 
Institution, the United States dominates 
the voting power by 21.92 per cent share 
(IFC: 2014). The United States also 
dominates voting power in International 
Development Association (IDA: 2014) by 
10.42 per cent share and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA: 
2014) by 15.02 per cent.  
The primacy of on-going economic 
development for China at this moment is 
rationally translated into the neo-
liberalists’ integration strategy to the 
existing international liberal economy 
system led by the United States. It is more 
rational for China to gain its national 
interests by pursuing more bargaining 
power and leadership within the well-
established international system (being a 
status quo state) compared to challenging 
US’ global leadership or trying to 
overthrow the liberal international regime 
led by the United States through the Cold 
War-type of hegemonic war (being a 
revisionist state). China finds incentives 
and opportunities in engaging and 
integrating itself into this US-led world 
order, doing so to advance China’s own 
national interests. For China, the road to 
modernity runs through integrating itself 
to the existing international order 
(Ikenberry 2011: p.61). Furthermore, 
China is externally bound by 
interdependence with their markets and 
suppliers. Therefore, the Chinese 
government is now convinced that strong 
links with the liberal international regime 
will best facilitate China’s struggle for 
economic development. This requires 
China to maintain a peaceful relationship 
with all states in the system since a 
conflict would destroy the political 
environment and opportunity necessary 
for economic development (Roy 1996: 
p.762). 
 A strategic cooperative relationship 
with the United States is advantageous for 
China at the moment, not only in 
economic matter but also in many other 
areas. Regarding economic interest, The 
United States has been taking 40 percent 
of China’s exports and has been a major 
source of foreign direct investment (Scott 
2013: p. 80). China would be vulnerable if 
the United States decided to punish it 
economically. China’s strategists believe 
that the United States and its allies could 
deny supplies of oil and metal ores to 
China during a military or economic crisis 
and that the US Navy could block China's 
access to strategically crucial sea-lanes 
(Nathan 2012: p.38). 
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 Foot (2006: p.80) argued that aside 
from economic benefit, the US global 
hegemony is also critical to China’s 
pursuit of another core national objective, 
which is reunification with Taiwan. 
Without United States’ support, the 
Taiwan’s leader would have long since 
been forced to give up their independent 
existence. It is also advantageous for 
China to integrate itself in the United 
States led international regimes to gain 
support in solving transnational problems 
such as terrorism, epidemics, and 
environmental degradation. 
 Overall, even though China 
undoubtedly would like to be recognized 
as an equal to or even better than the 
United States in the future, it realizes that 
this is unlikely to happen any time soon. 
In the present, China’s goal is a more 
egalitarian world system, which it hopes 
to achieve by maximizing the benefits of 
integration to the existing liberal 
international system led by the United 
States (Foot 2006: p.95). How long then 
China’s rising economy can be 
accommodated peacefully before it 
challenges US global hegemony? 
Ikenberry (2012: p. 64) argued, 
considering the fact that democracy and 
the rule of law are the hallmarks of global 
governance standard in the existing 
liberal international order, China will not 
overtake the US in world leadership in the 
current 21st century world order until it 
changes its authoritarian one-party-rule 
government system into a democratic 
government system, because the majority 
of Democratic states in the current system 
will not support the leadership of 
authoritarian China. It has not been 
predicted how long a democratic reform 
will take place in China, yet the growing 
Chinese middle class, the business elites, 
and human rights defenders will keep 
bringing the pressure.  
 What the neo-realists missed in 
analyzing the likelihood of China’s threat 
towards United States’ global hegemony 
in the present is to include the well-
established liberal international order as 
the variable of analysis. The existing 
international order is the background of 
China’s rising economy that eventually 
will not only create opportunities but also 
constrain China’s rational choices of 
foreign policy. Whereas the neo-realists 
assume the state as a unitary rational 
actor, the neo-liberalists assume the state 
as a unitary rational actor whose policy 
options are limited by the international 
order.  
China’s Peaceful Rise vs. China’s 
Assertiveness in the Region 
 As the emerging superpower in 
Asia, the rise of China has inevitably 
affected Northeast Asian and Southeast 
Asian countries directly due to 
geographical proximity. The region 
stability, in particular, is greatly 
influenced by China – ASEAN relation. 
China – ASEAN relation has historically 
gone through evolution. China was 
previously perceived as a threat by 
ASEAN member states. However, the end 
of Cold War was marked as a pivotal 
point of China – ASEAN relation. China 
aimed to play a role as a benevolent 
neighbor for ASEAN member states to 
strengthen regional stability, which would 
support China’s interest of economic 
development. (Egberink 2011: pp. 19-20). 
 Despite the claim of the neo-
liberalists regarding the negligible 
potential of China’s rise to challenge 
United States’ world hegemony in the 
immediate future, China’s rising economy 
and military power in the region has 
formulated several discourses arguing 
that China has succeeded United States’ 
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status as a hegemonic power in South East 
Asia. The notion of China’s rise as a threat 
towards the current international regimes 
led by the United States has also remained 
as China, under Xi Jinping leadership, 
pursues more leadership and assertive 
foreign policies in the region. In 
November 2013, China established the Air 
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), 
which included the disputed Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea (Zhang 
2015: p. 9). China also developed anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) force that 
could deter US intervention in a conflict in 
the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea (O’Rourke: 2016). The initiative of 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 
October 2013 was another indication of 
China’s assertive policy in providing 
economic leadership in the region. The 
Chinese-led financial institution is a 
multilateral development bank that will 
fund the development of infrastructure 
and other productive sectors in Asia 
(AIIB: 2015). 
 Around 50 states have signed the 
legal framework of AIIB in June 2015, 
excluding the United States and Japan. 
AIIB -which 30.4 percent of its equity 
belongs to China- was suspected as a 
revisionist instrument of China towards 
United States’ hegemony, particularly in 
the region. US President, Barack Obama, 
stated that China might utilize AIIB loans 
to meet its political or strategic rather than 
economic interest. As a consequence, the 
AIIB would have lower lending standards 
than existing US multilateral financial 
institutions like the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank, and thus 
decreasing their effectiveness (Aiyar: 
2015). 
  Nevertheless, China tried to 
mitigate the rising competitive tension 
with the United States as Xi Jinping 
visited the White House in September 
2015. During the visit, the United States 
and China issued the official factsheet on 
US-China economic relations which 
notes that ‚the United States welcomes 
China’s growing contributions to 
financing development and infrastructure 
in Asia and beyond.‛(The White House: 
2015). The AIIB is not mentioned 
explicitly in the document, yet the content 
of the document implicitly signals mutual 
understanding between the United States 
and China concerning multilateral 
financial institution. United States officials 
also noted that Xi Jinping provided his 
guarantee that the AIIB would abide by 
the highest international environmental 
and governance standards, just as other 
multilateral financial institution led by the 
United States (Panda: 2015). From this 
commitment, the presumption of AIIB as 
a revisionist effort of China towards the 
US hegemony in the region is quite weak, 
as the AIIB’s lending standard would less 
likely challenge the US-led liberal 
international system.  
 China’s assertive approaches under 
Xi’s administration inevitably raised 
questions towards the Chinese peaceful 
rise thesis, which was developed by 
Zheng Biijian (an important policy adviser 
to Chinese leaders) in 2003 and has been 
embraced by Chinese leaders ever since.  
Such assertiveness seemed like an 
endorsement to the proponent of ‘China 
Threat Theory’, such as Schweller and Pu 
(2011) whose paper argued that China is 
mapping various strategies to 
delegitimize US-led international order. 
According to them, on the one hand, 
China currently pragmatically 
accommodates US hegemony, but on the 
other, it contests the US’ legitimacy.  
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 Jian Zhang (2015: pp.1-4) provided 
an alternative in depth analysis to China’s 
assertive approaches under Xi Jinping. 
According to Zhang, Beijing still adheres 
to its declared ‘peaceful rise’ policy to 
maintain the stability of external 
environment conducive to its ascendance. 
The manner in which it seeks to do so is 
considerably different from past decades. 
China under Xi’s leadership faces more 
challenges in foreign relations compared 
to its predecessors. He concluded that 
Beijing since 2013 had entered the so-
called ‘peaceful rise 2.0.'  
 Zhang’s thesis of China’s ‘peaceful 
rise 2.0’ has three main features. First, 
China is more determined to vigorously 
protect its core national interest. In 2014, 
Xi called for the Chinese military to 
accelerate its effort in military 
modernization and improve its 
capabilities of winning wars. China has in 
recent years taken provocative actions in 
the region, especially in the South China 
Sea and the South China Sea disputes. 
According to Zhang interpretation, the 
new China’s ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ does not 
equal to zero conflict at all. Even if several 
limited conflicts takes place between 
China and other countries on certain 
issues, those conflicts will not amend the 
overall peaceful nature of China’s rise 
(Zhang 2015: pp. 4-5). 
 The second feature of China’s 
‘peaceful rise 2.0’ is the conditional nature 
of China’s commitment to the peaceful 
development policy. Under Xi’s 
leadership, China’s commitment is opted 
based on reciprocity. China seeks 
reciprocal strategic reassurances from 
other states in various international 
forums.  China called for an augmentation 
of an Asian community with shared 
responsibility to maintain regional peace 
and stability. The third feature of China’s 
‘peaceful rise 2.0’ is a more coordinated 
and proactive effort to create and 
maintain a stable external environment 
for the sake of China’s internal 
development. This feature is marked by 
Xi’s top-level foreign policy formulation, 
meaning the urgency to develop strategic 
visions, strategic planning and 
coordination at the national level (Zhang 
2015: pp. 6-7). 
 Jian Zhang (2015: pp. 9-11) argued 
that in an effort to manage its relations 
with the US and its neighboring countries 
in the region, Beijing proposed two 
concepts: ‘the new type of great power 
relationship’ and ‘community of common 
destiny.' The purpose of ‘the new type of 
great power relationship’ is to manage 
US-China relations based on non-conflict 
and non-confrontation principles, mutual 
respect and win-win cooperation. On the 
other hand, the concept of ‘community of 
common destiny’ is utilized by Xi to 
manage its relationships with neighboring 
countries, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
Regarding external relations, ASEAN has 
occupied a strategic importance as a top 
priority in China’s periphery diplomacy. 
China aims to let the sense of the 
‘community of common destiny’ take root 
in its neighbors. This initiative reflected 
China’s ambition to create a China-centric 
regional order.  
 China’s claim over peaceful nature of 
its rise and its assertive behaviors in the 
region, particularly in the East China Sea 
and the South China Sea, somehow evoke 
a fundamental question as to whether the 
current China is aspiring for hegemony. 
Professor Minxin Pei (2016) addressed this 
question by arguing that the current 
China is aspiring for regional hegemony, 
but not a global hegemony. China seeks 
regional hegemony for three reasons. First, 
it sees its role as Asia’s preeminent power 
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as a legitimate, natural and part of 
historical reality. China sees nothing 
wrong in becoming Asia’s hegemon 
because it has always been, except for the 
last 150 years (including the century of 
humiliation). The second reason is 
because China under Xi has the 
capabilities to pursue regional hegemony 
compared to the past when it has the 
aspiration but no capabilities. If the 
current growth of China continues, the 
gap of capabilities between China and the 
rest of Asia’s rising power is projected to 
be wider in the next ten years, whereas 
the gap between China and the US is 
forecasted to be closer. The last reason is 
that China aspires to gain the capacity to 
veto US’ actions in East Asia and the 
region in general.  
 The expected question followed 
then is why China does not seek global 
hegemony in the near future. Pei (2016) 
argued that China not pursue global 
hegemony because it does not have the 
ability to do so. Global hegemony requires 
the ability to acquire allies, while China 
does not have allies. China does not 
consider North Korea and Pakistan as its 
regional allies. China might have many 
trading partners inside and outside the 
region, but no allies. In order to be allies, 
two states should share the same value 
system and fundamental strategic interest. 
China also does not aspire for global 
hegemony because the current US’ global 
hegemony provides many benefits for 
China. China does not see US’ hegemony 
outside Asia as an obstruction for China’s 
interests. From the perspective of the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party, seeking 
for global hegemony in the near future 
would bring detriments to China.  If 
China pursues global hegemony, it has to 
commit enormous resources abroad and 
engage in an arms race with the US. A 
global hegemon should bear a lot of 
responsibilities abroad in the expense of 
its domestic regime security. The Chinese 
Communist Party is a very inward-
looking regime. It prioritized domestic 
survival compared to international glory. 
Lastly, to be a global hegemon, a state 
should have an ideological vision that 
justifies its international role. China is 
clearly lack in this aspect. Miller (2006) 
presented the concept of global hegemon 
as a status that plausibly attained by a 
superpower that possesses four axes of 
power (political, military, economic and 
cultural) and a capacity to project power 
and influence in more than one region of 
the globe at a time. 
 As Liu (2010) argued that each 
theoretical perspective in International 
Relations be inadequate to comprehend 
the rise of China, this paper acknowledges 
that neo-realism does provide 
supplementary explanation towards 
Southeast Asian states’ balancing 
behavior against China’s rise. Aside from 
China’s ambition to become the regional 
hegemon, how did Southeast Asia 
respond would be a strategic variable that 
determines China’s prospect as a regional 
hegemon. Karim and Chairil (2016: p.3) 
argued that despite the less perceived 
balancing behavior from Southeast Asian 
states towards China, it does exist. The 
rationales behind the less apparent 
balancing behavior from Southeast Asian 
states, even though China’s potential 
power is increasing and creating a 
military threat in Southeast Asia, is 
because Southeast Asia countries pursue 
indirect balancing against China by 
facilitating the continued US security 
commitment to the region. Indirect 
balancing is also being conducted through 
military build-up with the purpose of 
deterring the expansionist nature of the 
rising China, not of directly opposing 
China. Given China’s more assertive 
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approaches in the region, several 
Southeast Asian countries have 
increasingly decided to conduct indirect 
balancing due to the close economic 
relations between China and Southeast 
Asia, the state of asymmetric power 
between the Southeast Asian states and 
the lack of a possible defensive coalition 
among the Southeast Asian countries.  
 China under Xi Jinping would 
indeed gain more leadership in the region 
through its assertive approaches. 
However, China’s effort to succeed US’ 
hegemony in South East Asia would be 
restrained by several factors including 
China’s non-interference principle; other 
remaining well established US-led 
multilateral financial institutions in the 
region; China’s conflicting interest with its 
neighboring countries over the East China 
Sea and the South China Sea; and 
Southeast Asia’s indirect balancing 
against China’s rise. 
Conclusion 
 The rising economic power of China 
has generated speculations and scholarly 
debate on its likelihood to challenge the 
United States’ global hegemony and the 
existing international order. According to 
the neo-liberal school of thought, China’s 
rising economy in the 21st century will not 
pose a challenge to the well-established 
liberal international system that has been 
maintained by the US since the Cold War 
era. Moreover, China becomes a free rider 
in the system and its tremendous 
economic rise is enabled by the existing 
liberal international system. Instead of 
going through ideological hegemonic war 
with the US, a peaceful economic rise will 
give China more bargaining power and 
leadership within the whole system in 
general and its region in particular. From 
the elaboration of neo-liberal theory, it can 
be generated that the United States 
leadership and the existing liberal 
international system are two correlated 
yet separated facts. While the neo-liberals 
argue that China’s rising economy will 
not bring it to challenge the system, there 
is still possibility for China to challenge 
US’ global hegemony within the liberal 
international order. Even though it is less 
likely to happen in the immediate future 
as a democratic governmental system is a 
prerequisite for China’s global hegemonic 
role in the well-established liberal 
international order. The current one party 
ruled China aims to maintain its growth 
rate and to gain leadership in the region. 
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